Great analysis. Please add to to your list Germany, where the AfD is thought to have replaced Christian Dems as the most popular political party.
The rise of Populism corresponds with the largest and longest mass migration in modern history. People are on the move, as never before.The 1970 US had 9.6 million immigrants, comprising less than 5% of the US population. By 2025 US had over 50 million+, comprising 16%-18% of the US population. Nearly 10% of the entire native populations of more than a few Central and South American countries now reside in the US.
In that timeframe, the US has only added 100 million new housing units, but 40 million+ new immigrants. The types of housing has also changed. The US now produces only roughly 2/3rds the single family homes, we once built.
For many middle and lower earning Americans, along with Canadians and Australians, the single family home of their youth is but a mirage. They will never own one, and neither will their children, if they have any. In the US, states with the highest percentages of migrants, have the lowest homeownership rates and some of the most anemic native birthrates.
The same story is playing out all over the developed world. Housing costs have exploded, along with mass migration. Japan and Korea being notable immigration exceptions. The current Japanese leader may owe her election to a mere rumor Japan was considering more immigration.
Immigration at small absorbable levels tends to work for most native citizens, but more is not better, for native living standards. Nearly all mass migration, anywhere in the world, benefits only small groups. The wealthy and ruling class bask in a cheap servant caste and cheap business labor. Failing political Parties can create new voters, rather than winning over existing ones.
All while the real earnings and living standards of middle and lower earning native citizens, nearly universally, drop. Yet ruling classes keep insisting migration must perpetually increase, to increase GDP.
Only Switzerland with a large population of Western immigrants, is bucking the trend. They are likely to soon cap their population, ending much immigration. The Swiss are convinced their safety nets, housing and healthcare can no longer absorb, perpetual nonnative growth, even from the West. Ironically, the Socialist Dutch reached the same conclusion a few years ago. It hardly seems an accident, the Swiss and Dutch also enjoy the world's highest living standards.
Mass populism arrived in the developed world with mass migration. They will likely depart together as well.
"The government said applicants for Swedish citizenship would have to live in the country for eight years, up from five, have a monthly income of more than 20,000 Swedish crowns ($2,225), and be able to pass a language and culture test."
One way I’ve started to think about the shift you describe is less as “center-right vs populist right” and more as managerial conservatism vs insurgent conservatism.
Managerial conservatism (the old center-right) treated politics largely as stewardship. Maintain institutional stability, manage trade-offs, rely on expert systems, and correct problems gradually. Stability itself was a core value.
Insurgent conservatism emerges when large parts of the electorate lose trust in that stewardship. It assumes the problem is not just policy drift but elite mismanagement or unresponsiveness, so conflict becomes necessary rather than something to avoid. That naturally produces more explicit rhetoric and greater willingness to break with institutional or business consensus.
What’s interesting is that the roots of this loss of trust seem to be both economic and cultural.
Economically, the globalization wave of the 1990s and the legitimacy shock of the 2008 financial crisis weakened confidence that elites were managing the system competently or fairly.
Culturally, rapid norm changes and increasingly moralized institutional politics (DEI frameworks, speech norms, identity conflicts, etc.) reinforced the sense that many institutions were moving society in directions that large numbers of citizens had little say over.
When those two pressures accumulate at the same time, managerial politics starts to look evasive or disconnected, which helps explain why insurgent movements have appeared across so many Western democracies at roughly the same time. That may also explain why the phenomenon appears across Western democracies regardless of their specific party systems.
The open question, as you hint at, is what happens next. Insurgent movements are often very effective at displacing a governing model, but translating insurgency into durable governance is a much harder task.
Great analysis. Please add to to your list Germany, where the AfD is thought to have replaced Christian Dems as the most popular political party.
The rise of Populism corresponds with the largest and longest mass migration in modern history. People are on the move, as never before.The 1970 US had 9.6 million immigrants, comprising less than 5% of the US population. By 2025 US had over 50 million+, comprising 16%-18% of the US population. Nearly 10% of the entire native populations of more than a few Central and South American countries now reside in the US.
In that timeframe, the US has only added 100 million new housing units, but 40 million+ new immigrants. The types of housing has also changed. The US now produces only roughly 2/3rds the single family homes, we once built.
For many middle and lower earning Americans, along with Canadians and Australians, the single family home of their youth is but a mirage. They will never own one, and neither will their children, if they have any. In the US, states with the highest percentages of migrants, have the lowest homeownership rates and some of the most anemic native birthrates.
The same story is playing out all over the developed world. Housing costs have exploded, along with mass migration. Japan and Korea being notable immigration exceptions. The current Japanese leader may owe her election to a mere rumor Japan was considering more immigration.
Immigration at small absorbable levels tends to work for most native citizens, but more is not better, for native living standards. Nearly all mass migration, anywhere in the world, benefits only small groups. The wealthy and ruling class bask in a cheap servant caste and cheap business labor. Failing political Parties can create new voters, rather than winning over existing ones.
All while the real earnings and living standards of middle and lower earning native citizens, nearly universally, drop. Yet ruling classes keep insisting migration must perpetually increase, to increase GDP.
Only Switzerland with a large population of Western immigrants, is bucking the trend. They are likely to soon cap their population, ending much immigration. The Swiss are convinced their safety nets, housing and healthcare can no longer absorb, perpetual nonnative growth, even from the West. Ironically, the Socialist Dutch reached the same conclusion a few years ago. It hardly seems an accident, the Swiss and Dutch also enjoy the world's highest living standards.
Mass populism arrived in the developed world with mass migration. They will likely depart together as well.
When will your Substack be up and running?
Seconded!
Sweden has recently followed suit as well:
"The government said applicants for Swedish citizenship would have to live in the country for eight years, up from five, have a monthly income of more than 20,000 Swedish crowns ($2,225), and be able to pass a language and culture test."
https://www.reuters.com/world/sweden-tighten-citizenship-rules-amid-push-cut-immigration-2026-02-09/
The rise in populism reflects the loss of faith in our institutions which started with their ideological capture in the 2010s.
One way I’ve started to think about the shift you describe is less as “center-right vs populist right” and more as managerial conservatism vs insurgent conservatism.
Managerial conservatism (the old center-right) treated politics largely as stewardship. Maintain institutional stability, manage trade-offs, rely on expert systems, and correct problems gradually. Stability itself was a core value.
Insurgent conservatism emerges when large parts of the electorate lose trust in that stewardship. It assumes the problem is not just policy drift but elite mismanagement or unresponsiveness, so conflict becomes necessary rather than something to avoid. That naturally produces more explicit rhetoric and greater willingness to break with institutional or business consensus.
What’s interesting is that the roots of this loss of trust seem to be both economic and cultural.
Economically, the globalization wave of the 1990s and the legitimacy shock of the 2008 financial crisis weakened confidence that elites were managing the system competently or fairly.
Culturally, rapid norm changes and increasingly moralized institutional politics (DEI frameworks, speech norms, identity conflicts, etc.) reinforced the sense that many institutions were moving society in directions that large numbers of citizens had little say over.
When those two pressures accumulate at the same time, managerial politics starts to look evasive or disconnected, which helps explain why insurgent movements have appeared across so many Western democracies at roughly the same time. That may also explain why the phenomenon appears across Western democracies regardless of their specific party systems.
The open question, as you hint at, is what happens next. Insurgent movements are often very effective at displacing a governing model, but translating insurgency into durable governance is a much harder task.
City Journal has a good piece digging into the hows and whys of this.
https://www.city-journal.org/article/trump-populism-immigration-democracy
Thanks for including . I read the City Journal, although not regularly. I should start. That was incredibly well written and informative.
The answer to the authors question is YES.
Adversely unless the dems get their stuff together. unlikely.