The Decline of the Democratic Coalition, 2012-2024

Farewell to the “rising American electorate.”

Right after the 2024 election, I wrote the following based on the limited data that were available at the time:

At one point in the initial rollout of Harris’s campaign, there was much happy (joyful?) talk of getting the band back together—the return of the mighty Obama coalition. The “rising American electorate” would have its revenge on Trump, the Republicans, and their retrograde supporters from declining demographics.

That’s not exactly how it worked out. Instead, Trump won every swing state and the election, carried the national popular vote and made dramatic headway among key demographics that were supposed to buoy the rising American electorate. In short, the rising American electorate didn’t rise, it crashed.

As Democrats dig out from their debacle, it’s important for them to understand just how far away they now are from the salad days of the Obama coalition. In 12 short years, they have lost two of three elections to Donald Trump and huge chunks of support from key demographics, including most of their rising constituencies. They need to face the uncomfortable fact that not only did the Obama coalition not come back, it’s likely never coming back. It’s time for a new coalitional strategy—a strategy that starts with rebuilding their support among working-class Americans of all races and forcefully jettisoning all the political baggage that is preventing them from doing so.

Since then, a lot more data have been released including just this week Catalist’s detailed estimates of demographic group performance and trends in the 2024 election. How does my analysis hold up in light of these more complete and reliable data? Pretty darn good I think. Here are some of the particulars from the new Catalist data which illustrate the extent of the Democratic coalition’s decline since 2012 (all figures based on the two party vote). There’s no sugar-coating it: these are disturbing data for a party that thought it was on the verge of a lengthy period of political dominance and now can’t beat a deeply flawed and widely disliked candidate like Trump.

Black voters. Obama carried black voters in 2012 by an amazing 93 points. Harris managed only a 71-point margin. Democratic decline: 22 points.

Latino voters. Obama carried Latinos by 35 points; in 2024, the Democratic margin was down to just 8 points. Democratic decline: 27 points. It is interesting that the overall decline since 2012 is fairly similar between blacks and Latinos; however, essentially all of the decline for Latinos was post-2016 while the black decline has been more or less continuous.

Working-class (non-college) voters overall. Obama was the last Democratic presidential candidate to carry the working class as a whole (2-point margin); every presidential election since then has seen steadily worsening Democratic performance among these voters. In 2024, Democrats lost them by a solid 10-point margin. Democratic decline: 12 points.

White working-class voters. The traditional trouble spot for Democrats; Obama lost them by 20 points, which went up to 27 points in this election. Democratic decline: 7 points (which contrasts with the 8-point gain over the time period with white college-educated voters). However, the white working-class decline pales in magnitude when compared to the decline among nonwhite working-class voters.

Nonwhite working-class voters. Obama cleaned up among nonwhite working-class voters, carrying them by 64 points in 2012. In the 2024 election the margin was down to 32 points, exactly cutting the 2012 Democratic advantage in half. This is perhaps the most remarkable trend of them all. A Democratic Party that can’t keep voters that are both nonwhite and working class in the fold is a Democratic Party whose presumed purpose is rapidly vanishing.

Latino working-class voters. The primary locus of this decline was among Latino working-class voters. These voters gave Obama a 38-point advantage in 2024, much higher than among the Latino college-educated. In 2024 this crashed to a mere 6-point advantage for Harris. Democratic decline: 33 points, two and a half times the decline among the Hispanic college-educated.

Young voters. Obama carried voters under 30 by 25 points; in 2024, the Democratic margin fell to 11 points. Democratic decline: 14 points.

Of course, this is comparing an age group that had a different generational composition in the two elections. But this should provide little comfort to Democrats. The 18-29 year old age group in the 2024 election was composed almost entirely of Gen Z voters, supposedly the leading edge of a generational shift that would make the voting pool ever more Democratic. In 2012, the 18-29 year olds who provided Obama’s 25-point margin were all members of the Millennial generation. In 2024, those Millennial voters were entirely contained in the 30-44 year old age group, where Democrats eked out only a 5-point advantage. So much for the generational theory of political dominance.

Black young voters. Black voters under 30 gave Obama a 91-point margin in 2012. Harris carried them by a comparatively modest 66 points. Democratic decline: 25 points.

Latino young voters. In 2012, Obama dominated Hispanic voters under 30 by 51 points. In 2024, the Democratic margin among these voters was just 14 points. Democratic decline: 37 points.

Male voters. Obama lost male voters in 2012 by 5 points; in 2024 the Democratic deficit among men reached 16 points. Democratic decline: 11 points. It’s important to note that the Democratic advantage among women was essentially the same over the two elections. Therefore, while it is true that the gender gap has widened over the time period (from 16 to 27 points), the widening of the gender gap between 2012 and 2024 is entirely attributable to Democrats doing worse among men, not to doing better among women. This is an uncomfortable fact for Democrats to face, but face it they must.

Black male voters. While black female voters have also shifted right over time, the shift among black men has been far larger—about two and a half times the size. In 2012, Obama carried black men by 91 points; the Democratic margin crashed to 58 points in 2024. Democratic decline: 33 points.

Latino male voters. Latino men have also shifted harder right than their female counterparts. Obama enjoyed a 25-point advantage among Hispanic men in 2012. In the 2024 election, Harris actually lost these voters by 6 points. Democratic decline: 32 points.

The “rising American electorate” strategy has failed. So much for Plan A. We’ll see if the Democrats have a Plan B. On current evidence, I’m not optimistic.