The Limits of Resistance Liberalism

Saying "this isn't normal" is not enough. The center-left needs a viable alternative to right-wing populism.

Although the extended Trump era could never be described as stable, there have been times when the Trump White House has been more erratic, hubristic, and bellicose than usual. Arguably, Donald Trump’s remorseless reaction to the white nationalist “Unite the Right” rally in August 2017, which resulted in the death of counter-demonstrator Heather Heyer, was one such moment, as were various outbursts between the start of the Covid-19 pandemic and the protests and unrest that followed George Floyd’s killing; still another moment spanned from Joe Biden’s election victory in November 2020 to the Capitol riots and Trump’s attempted autogolpe on January 6th, 2021.

The events of the last few weeks have again spiked the anxiety of all outside of MAGA’s orbit, disturbing even those who have grown inured to Trump’s incessant drama and knack for provocation. There is a profound feeling, even among Trump’s less fervid critics, that his posture—towards domestic dissent, America’s neighbors, its allies, and even the foundations of national prosperity—far exceeds in its intemperance and nihilism anything previously witnessed. Between the U.S. capture of Venezuela’s now ex-president Nicolás Maduro, the massive siege-like deployment of ICE agents in Minneapolis that has resulted in another killing by federal law enforcement, and Trump’s declared intent to acquire Greenland, steeped in animus toward fellow NATO members, we have a stark picture of what “Trump unbound” looks like.

And yet, the language used to convey the significance of what is happening has struggled to keep pace, much less resonate with all who continue to give Trump the benefit of the doubt or fall within the murky league of “anti-anti-Trump” voters (that is, those who are more suspicious of the president’s foes than his own means and motives). Unbowed by mockery, Resistance liberals and Never Trump Republicans have long cried, “None of this is normal!” in response to Trump’s transgressions. Conditions have indeed become manifestly abnormal—enough for Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, a technocrat not known for rhetorical excess, to imply Trump has catalyzed an irreversible “rupture” in the international order and Atlanticist alliance.

But the basic vindication of this thesis, though registered with greater urgency by the media, is unlikely to transform partisan sentiment—at least until a calamity with far-reaching material consequences transpires. There are two main reasons why, besides the obvious fealty of those whose ardor prevents Trump’s approval rating from collapsing. One is that, due to his perseverance, Trump and Trumpism have been rationalized to a degree no one expected in 2015; even many critics have been caught up explaining his behavior as simultaneously sui generis and traceable to American political traditions, such as Jacksonian populism and McKinleyite expansionism, that are “legitimate,” if not particularly ennobling. The other is that the ecosystem of progressivism has frequently suffered from the same disconnect as MAGA and Trump’s sycophants. The cardinal sin of modern progressivism, with its fixation on subverting sociocultural norms and imposing new ones without real democratic input, is that it did not offer conflicted and “politically homeless” Americans a shared reality and universal principles, but a rival dogma no less Manichean than MAGA.

That, fatefully, fed the left’s own epistemic closure on the issues that would dominate the 2024 election. The organs of progressive thought willfully ignored how ordinary people felt about the largest surge in immigration since the 1890s and found it incomprehensible that social justice tribalism had begun to repel Americans who previously saw Trump as a grave and unique threat. Astonishingly—or perhaps not—the Democrats’ reputation on the sociocultural front became bad enough to attract protest votes to Trump’s cause and expand his coalition by over three million ballots.

Events over the last year ought to have disabused Trump’s newer converts of the fantasy he would govern any less ideologically—that a vengeful Trump could ever truly be “pragmatic.” But the laws of electoral politics do not work as they once did. And Democrats, while eager to close the door on Biden-era misjudgments and exploit the alleged unraveling of Trump’s 2024 coalition, still have failed to present an ironclad alternative to our untenable “new normal.”

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To understand why Democratic support isn’t soaring at this moment, we must first examine what has effectively permitted many Americans to rationalize Trump’s flaws. There is the misguided impression, based partly on the sheer number of empty threats Trump has leveled, that the Trump doctrine is more bark than bite (expressed in the latest parlance as “Trump Always Chickens Out,” or TACO). When Trump does back off from an ultimatum, as he appears to have done with his threat to seize Greenland, or becomes preoccupied with something comparatively less disruptive, the broader public, investors and major economic institutions, and world leaders are grateful for the reprieve.

Inadvertently, however, that reinforces for some observers that Trump’s most unflinching critics are equally hyperbolic as he is. The Resistance warns American democracy’s death knell is near while Trump blares countless unpresidential, mafioso-style threats; yet the system seems to grind along, at least for those in communities unaffected by ICE’s intimidatory conduct or exploding health care costs. As a result, this false equivalency—unintentionally strengthened further by public intellectuals (understandably) interested in parsing what Trumpism “really is”—undercuts the case against Trump, thus inhibiting genuine mass opposition.

Frustrated by the public’s recurring passivity, the Resistance simply devotes more energy to copiously documenting all the ways in which they are quite right to be alarmed. This, however, diverts the anti-Trump camp from developing a positive vision for how to move the country forward. After a full decade—along with two years of fruitlessly insisting Bidenism was as consequential as LBJ’s domestic achievements—the Resistance has yet to make MAGA patently unattractive to those who like what America First, in its most benign interpretation, stands for on paper: limited immigration, an end to foreign entanglements, preventing another China shock, low-cost energy and staples, and high-wage industrial jobs for the majority of Americans without a college degree.

None of these policy preferences are inherently disreputable, including the more recent goal of overhauling DEI practices; all, in theory, could be justified without the whiff of Trumpian chauvinism. But because the Resistance is fixated on how toxic Trump is, Democrats are boxed into a corner, petrified of taking a nuanced but clear approach that distinguishes the sentiments and concerns of American citizens from the man who has preyed on them.

What happens instead is that the Resistance chorus gets caught up in the perpetual refrain of “We told you so,” which many disaffected Americans have turned a deaf ear to. While cataloging every Trump transgression may, for some, be a way to stand firm and not surrender to indifference, for others, Trump’s transparent flaws have become an unexpected asset: unlike past presidents, he doesn’t try to sanitize what power is about or for. He forthrightly promises to relieve the country of trade and defense free-riders as well as any obligation to atone for historical episodes and practices that betrayed American values. This sort of “honesty” was always going to appeal to the segment of the electorate that was convinced America had gotten a raw deal this century and that liberal internationalism is phony window-dressing that compromises the national interest. More beguiling for the Resistance, however, is that some Americans who don’t identify explicitly as MAGA followers have lately “come around” to Trump’s view of certain national priorities, even if they still intermittently “disapprove” of his manner and tactics.

Trump foes call this “sane-washing,” and while I personally agree this happens all too often, one can understand why it does. Remove the “Trump persona”—the traits that engender such passionate feelings about his morality or lack thereof—from evaluations of Trump’s record, and it can sometimes seem “not so bad” when stacked against the legacies of other polarizing, compromised presidents (e.g., Richard Nixon, who, we must remember, escalated the bombing of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) or those who fell well short of expectations (a conversation many partisan Democrats promptly like to end). This more “dispassionate” reading of Trump and his impact is not limited to political independents or “low-information” voters. Press those on the left old enough to remember the national conversation from 2002 through 2005, and even today, a good deal will hesitate to conclude Trump is worse than George W. Bush was.

This is not to trivialize that the Resistance encounters what is, from their perspective, genuine political madness: swing and low-propensity voters simply shrugging at the proverbial wolf at the door. But, as unwelcome as it is, such quiescence isn’t exactly irrational. The paradox, and curse, borne by those who believe Trump will irrevocably bankrupt American power is that they have never been wrong about the fundamental risks, but they haven’t been right enough about every forecast of disaster. There has been no great collective sacrifice for dubious ends imposed under Trump (although that may yet change). The tariff chaos has been unnecessary, and the punishing loss of ACA subsidies may be enough to fuel a blue wave this November. But a recession hasn’t hit, and many people expect Trump to exit the national stage in three years, however noisily.

Much of the public has also gotten “used to” Trump—an indictment, one might say, of the major decisions and inaction that preceded his rise. After a quarter century of broken promises, the prevalence of anti-system sentiment has become unremarkable, thus leading unrepentant Trump voters and even Trump haters to ask, what is normal anymore?

“Complacency,” accordingly, is easier and less tawdry than it may otherwise have been. Indeed, although many adjectives and theories have been employed to capture the gravity of Trumpism’s illiberal core—that it will accelerate, not reverse, America’s decadence and eclipse—the effect on moderates and independents seems to have only dulled over time. Tolerance for Trumpian excess is so ingrained now that it takes more extreme forms of overreach to turn popular opinion against him and produce an avalanche of historically dismal polls. And so, as long as the system mostly withstands Trump’s caprice and temper and “fair and free” elections proceed as expected, the “sane-washing,” or whatever one prefers to call it, will continue. That makes it all the more difficult to persuade the less unnerved that Trump’s most recent unprecedented actions are uniquely detrimental to international security, America’s standing, and, ultimately, the welfare of average citizens.

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The seeming futility of that endeavor brings us to the second reason why talk of Trump’s abnormality and his gleeful disregard for norms is woefully insufficient to win hearts and minds. Democrats see a basic juxtaposition between a political movement that has summoned America’s demons and that which is decent, compassionate, and of sound judgment. But the problem for Democrats is that what they have defended—or effectively justified by omitting from open debate—strikes many voters who will decide the 2026 and 2028 elections as not especially normal, either. These voters feel, in fact, that doctrinaire progressives reflect none of those upright qualities, that, in the worst instances, the liberal establishment indulged ideologues eager to monetize “DEI,” spread language policies, and vilify disagreement. In a nutshell, Democrats are struggling because they are still afraid to abandon progressive identity politics and dominate the common ground, even though there is no other way to decisively win the places Democrats must win to bury MAGA.

An example from the last presidential election illustrates the stubbornness—and, frankly, the intellectual arrogance—that backstops an otherwise discredited theory of political power. For about two weeks in mid-summer of 2024, as progressives and liberals marshalled enthusiasm for the hastily assembled Harris-Walz ticket and attempted to banish Joe Biden’s enfeebled debate performance from the minds of alarmed voters, Democrats took to the airwaves to marvel at just how “weird” Trump and MAGA’s inner circle are. That moment of levity might have been cathartic, but it did not deliver votes in critical counties or stop blue city defections. Just as bad, it magnified the Brahmin left’s lack of insight on policy choices and rhetoric that many voters previously anchored in American liberalism find foolish, harmful, and yes, downright “weird.”

Most Democrats, of course, find it difficult to believe the demands of their activist base could likewise be considered “abnormal.” They may prefer to stay silent about which Biden policies proved unpopular and use every ounce of discipline to focus on “affordability.” But they are sorely mistaken in thinking they can successfully mimic Trump in this regard and refuse to own up to any error.

At their peril, they ignore that, as the party identified with stronger government, they profit from implementing popular programs but also typically face a steeper penalty for poor governance. And a harsh penalty they faced after promising a return to normalcy under Biden. Support for de facto open borders; a maximalist approach to gender identity that demanded co-partisans (and the state and scientific-medical community) affirm every claim propounded by radical theorists and activists; the injection of “decoloniality” and race-reductionist “antiracist” thought into major institutions as well as everyday speech and personal relationships; a tendency to downplay or dismiss concerns about public safety in the name of countering police misconduct—all these issues and positions came to define modern progressivism, and thus the Democratic agenda, despite few national Democrats explicitly endorsing “wokeness.”

How much will it take to convince middle-of-the-road voters and disenchanted Trump voters that Democrats will act differently if returned to power? In theory, it shouldn’t be too hard—a few definite mea culpas from leaders as different as Elizabeth Warren and Gavin Newsom, backed by concrete steps that show Democrats no longer think they can ignore or discount the issues that got Trump reelected. Yet prominent Democrats who have the authority to shape the party’s future shrink from challenging a disastrous assumption: that voters-of-conscience, by dint of all of Trumpism’s nasty associations, will conclude the worldview of the activist left is unobjectionable and morally coherent, and that its pattern of immoderation merely reflects youthful idealism. Democratic operatives and their activist counterparts were grievously wrong about that in 2024 and remain so today. As TLP’s Ruy Teixeira writes, Democrats are opting, despite plenty of sober advice, to privilege “coalition management over coalition expansion.”

It’s possible, of course, they might not have to make hard choices in light of Trump’s increasingly unstable rule and abuse of power. Perhaps the broader public will soon find ICE’s conduct so ghastly that the “Resistance liberals were right” will become a household refrain across critical swing districts. Perhaps voters who felt ostracized by Democrats will reach an epiphany about the threat Trump represents and the damage he has already done. But such wish-casting ignores the central lessons of the Trump era, when there is no such time to waste. One has to ask, why take that chance if the fate of the country is truly at stake?