Toward A Bolder Theory of Party Renewal

Two theories of how to win back power have animated Democrats since Kamala Harris’s crushing loss last November. As encapsulated by the nationwide “No Kings” protests held on October 18, one effectively boils down to fighting the Trump administration harder and standing up more firmly for “core values.” In its reading of the 2024 election, the party (as well as mainstream media) simply didn’t do enough during Biden’s presidency to warn of Trump’s authoritarianism.

Accordingly, Democratic leaders have employed various strategies to show greater resolve. From Gavin Newsom broadcasting surreal AI videos that lampoon Trump and JD Vance to blue state attorneys general and legal groups suing the administration for actions that breach the Constitution to congressional leaders tolerating a government shutdown in a bid to extract GOP concessions on health care, Democrats hope to placate a restive base while reengaging irregular supporters and independents who swung to Trump in 2024 but have since regretted their vote.

In contrast to the Resistance revamp, the alternate, populist theory takes a closer look at the sources of economic discontent that have helped sustain Trump’s political dominance and expand his base. Its proponents argue Democrats must reckon with their widening deficit with the working class—not just Rust Belt whites, but Latinos, young black men, and Asians who have grown disillusioned with Democratic rule in major metros. Their case is an implicit rebuttal of Resistance boilerplate. In their view, Democratic pleas to fight for democracy ring hollow when working people can’t provide for themselves and are at the mercy of voracious, privileged forces. As Maine’s insurgent Senate candidate Graham Platner recently put it, the fight must “not just [be] for a romantic freedom,” but for “the material freedom…to live a life of dignity and joy.”

To be sure, the populist case doesn’t minimize the despotic behavior of Trump and wrathful administration officials like Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller. Nor are left-populists under the illusion that they can suddenly convert the Rust Belt’s most fervent MAGA supporters. On the contrary, most seem to be realists, mindful of the brutal political geography that avowed Resistance Democrats typically elide. Yet the intensification of the Democratic Party’s stark regional weaknesses is precisely why left-populists assert the old Resistance playbook is inadequate for this moment—and perhaps was always unsuited to repelling Trumpism. The terrain may be daunting, left-populists argue, but Democrats have no other choice: to actually safeguard democracy, they must back insurgents who could break the losing streak in districts that were pivotal to the Democratic coalition a generation ago.

If the goal is to truly reach Americans who have lost faith in politics, the populist theory of party renewal offers a path to grassroots organizing that the Resistance framework struggles to inspire. Indeed, the advantages seem obvious. Regular working people not only feel like they are not getting ahead but also that they are mercilessly squeezed by the cost of basic needs. Fear of stagflation and rising health care costs are also currently the GOP’s chief liabilities. A vigorous attack on the affordability crisis would put Republicans on the defensive while forcing Democrats to contemplate a vision that transcends regional and cultural divides. (If only for the sheer necessity of changing the “political opportunity structure,” it’s easy to see why moderately populist measures are gaining traction with establishment figures such as Newsom, the de facto leader of Resistance 2.0 and a likely 2028 contender.)

Yet, at least in its current iteration, the populist approach falls short in solving the party’s problems with the working class. This is because it is predicated on the mistaken belief that authentic economic populism can, in every instance, overcome a culture war that progressives have had a hand in perpetuating. Thus far, proponents won’t really venture that defusing polarization requires some daylight between insurgents and progressives’ most untenable cultural positions. That may seem self-defeating, but the reason for such reticence is simple. Notwithstanding some minor internal critiques, most of what sectarian progressives have insisted people of “good conscience” must support has become the third rail of Democratic politics. Even if they wanted to, progressive populists are allowed little room to maneuver. That’s unfortunate, because from the perspective of leery and disaffected voters, it undercuts their claims of independence from a self-dealing and unaccountable establishment.

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This constraint highlights one of the key lessons progressives have yet to fully digest about the Trump era. Democrats and progressives of all varieties deflect from the role of culture in a party system convulsed by anti-establishment sentiment, in which “the establishment” is now closely associated with a distinctly anti-populist and handsomely funded progressive vanguard. Democrats, convinced they were the party of a “rising electorate,” became reluctant to absorb any criticism of the sociocultural agenda they embraced, believing the slightest opposition betokened dangerous illiberalism. That made it harder still to convince working-class people outside of existing Democratic strongholds that they had a friend and champion in the Democratic Party.

Now, both the scope of Trump’s coalition and subsequent polling suggest a sea change in public opinion has taken place, at least relative to predictions last decade that Republicans were on track to be a rump party of rural white conservative evangelicals. Remarkably, despite the pervasiveness of the online right’s racism and nihilistic subculture within formal GOP ranks, it is the Democrats who are increasingly seen by regular voters as the party that is out-of-step on the most salient sociocultural questions.

This is unsettling terrain for Democrats. The problem, however, goes beyond overcoming charges of progressive elitism. In a major historical reversal, Democrats are no longer broadly seen as the party explicitly committed to helping more people attain the American dream. This is an ominous development attributable not to right-wing propaganda, but to how insular the party has become. In the post-civil rights era, liberal Democrats frustrated by the defections of blue-collar whites could reasonably say they sometimes paid an ugly penalty for supporting racial integration, affirmative action, and a woman’s right to an abortion. Today, it is harder to conclude working-class voters are turning down a program of economic egalitarianism because they reject the cultural liberalism that is part of the Democratic equation. Rather, more and more voters across race and region think cultural priorities have eclipsed Democrats’ traditional commitments to economic uplift and collective progress, and worse, that what remains of these commitments are mainly symbolic gestures to the party’s New Deal heritage.

Given these sobering challenges, one might think Democrats are finally willing to have an open debate over the way forward. But there are reasons to worry they won’t. For one thing, the Resistance revamp naturally appeals to the Democratic faithful because although it fosters the sensation that something is being done, it demands very little change. Indeed, it mainly serves to vent frustration with a “leaderless” party elite, rather than deal frankly with the party’s long-term strategic errors, particularly its retreat from huge sections of the Midwest and South.

In fact, the prevailing “accountability” discourse—in which Democrats, allied advocacy groups, and dutiful small donors demand each other to hold Trump accountable—essentially keeps inconvenient facts like Democrats’ steep deficit with non-college voters, their looming disadvantage in the Electoral College due to migration from expensive blue states, and the surge in registered Republican voters at the margins of discussion. No one really faces the consequences of having pushed policies and talking points that alienated mainstream voters who once voted for Barack Obama. The script is overwhelmingly about Trump’s awfulness, prolonging Democrats’ evasion of both their cultural baggage and the pessimism that has engulfed so much of American society.

In a healthy party determined to face up to its losses, the case for economic populism, and its corollary, working-class abundance, would overtake the exhausted Resistance framework. Unfortunately, the same demographic trends that have made Resistance liberalism and “emancipatory” identity politics the perceived centerpiece of the Democratic agenda have made it difficult for Democrats to convincingly channel their populist forebearers.

The concentration of Democratic power in superstar cities magnifies the difficulty of engineering a populist makeover. Taking a page from Bernie Sanders’ book, more Democrats have delighted lately in assailing Trump’s billionaire buddies. But while the rhetoric might sound tough relative to the Obama or Clinton years, it can’t obscure the awkward fact that Democrats increasingly derive their support from the knowledge economy’s winners. House Democrats now represent some of the country’s wealthiest and highly educated districts, while Republicans represent some of the neediest—a development not enough Democrats seem perturbed by. On top of Trump’s massive gains with Americans earning less than $80,000 per year, these dynamics have had an overlooked impact on the way in which the party approaches political economy and coalition-building.

In particular, the party’s changing demographic composition has led more elected Democrats, whether “neoliberal” or “fiscally liberal,” to stress targeted transfers and social programs over high-wage pre-distribution and tougher laws against economic predation. This doesn’t mean that the latter set is more important than the other; a party sincerely committed to bold reform would combine dignity-enhancing welfare measures with market regulations that maximize opportunity, development, and financial freedom for the working class. But the shift in the Democratic camp over the last quarter-century raises questions over whether the party will advance ideas and proposals that create a genuine opening in Trump-trending counties.

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It would seem, then, that neither theory of party renewal has a satisfying answer for the “working-class hole” Democrats must face. The Resistance revamp simply offers more of the same at a time when Democrats need fresh motivation and a more optimistic narrative. The case for patriotic economic populism could supply these, provided that Democrats do not get in their own way with platitudes that resonate neither with traditional workers nor those desperate to do more than survive the relentless churn of the gig and service economy. Yet in all probability its potential will go unrealized so long as Democrats circle the wagons on cultural stances we have good reason to believe have shed more voters than they have gained.

Therein lies the madness of the Democrats’ current trajectory. The party’s power brokers profess to stand nobly for all that is good and true, when in fact, they have made the unprincipled and indefensible choice to affirm their withdrawal from so many parts of the country. In doing so, they impose an impossible burden on those reformers who want a different future. Progressive populists want to drastically change how the party approaches left-behind regions and Middle America. But until they are permitted to take a middle course on issues that have needlessly estranged working-class voters who are “conservative” only relative to the post-2014 goalposts, proponents of the “populist” approach will be rebuffed by many of the very “persuadables” they have endeavored to win over as proof they are fashioning a big tent.

Put another way, Democratic inroads in key regions will be limited, ensuring one of two undesirable outcomes: a period of unproductive and unstable divided government, with few avenues to advance the economic reform progressive populists have sworn by, or the MAGA Republican hegemony that both progressive populists and Resistance types fear will irrevocably deform American democracy.

Democrats who are intent on avoiding such outcomes must come to their senses. As in the great upheavals of the past, lasting progress won’t be possible if the less-educated and left-behind are deemed morally backward or beneath the rigors of democratic citizenship. Indeed, most of the great achievements in the history of American reform would never have occurred without the energy and fidelity of regular working people, plenty of whom would be judged as conservatives and traditionalists by today’s standards despite their sacrifices to make a better world possible. They made these contributions because they believed the fabric of American life was at stake—that without the freedom to build fruitful lives and purposeful communities, the American experiment would unravel.

Ultimately, Democrats need a better theory of party renewal—one that not only speaks to the anger and distrust that threaten to rend society but also honors once more the desire for strong families, dignified communities, and national belonging.